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I. INTRODUCTION
Politicians get away with murder! This common statement tends to
reflect how many feel about the privileged class of people who make and
enforce the law. Nevertheless, the litigious nature of the United States has
caught up with the current President of the United States, Bill Clinton. He
is accused of several state and federal civil rights violations' allegedly
committed against Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee.2
President Clinton was given leave to argue the ruling in Nixon v.
* B.A., 1992, University of South Florida; M.A., 1993, Nova University; Candidate for
Juris Doctor, 1996, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. The author would
like to thank Roslyn Greenfield and Ruth Wilder for their advice and encouragement during the
preparation of this article.
I. Jones' action alleges that Clinton, while Governor of Arkansas, violated her civil and due
process rights by sexually harassing and assaulting her in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
(1988). She also claims that Clinton violated Arkansas state laws by committing defamation and
outrage. See Jones v. Clinton 869 F. Supp. 690, 691 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
2. Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
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Fitzgerald' gives him absolute immunity from being sued while holding
office, so that Jones' suit should be dismissed without prejudice until after
he leaves office. The district court did not agree and held that the
President is subject to discovery but the initial trial may be delayed until
after he leaves office.4
On January 9, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, with Judge Bowman writing for the majority, ruled in a
two to one decision that the President is subject to the same rules which
apply to every American citizen.5 The court held that since the actions
alleged were not "official acts," Nixon v. Fitzgerald could not provide the
President any type of immunity in this instance and the pretrial discovery
could proceed.6 The Circuit Court based its opinion on a strict reading of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald.7 The District Court based much of its decision on
what it called the "English Legacy," and on Supreme Court decisions
(mainly Fitzgerald) to conclude President Clinton does not have full
immunity from suit.'
The District Court's comparison of English law and history
concerning the issue of immunity was used to aid the court in interpreting
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and was thus given more
weight than it deserved. On the other hand, the circuit court never
touched upon the "English Legacy."
This article will discuss and analyze the fundamental differences
between executive immunity in the United States and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The first part of this article will
discuss the "American position." This section will analyze the historical
development the courts have taken concerning the constitutionality of
enjoining, subpoenaing, and suing the President of the United States for
actions committed during his term and even before his term commenced.
After discussing the American position, the second part of this article,
titled, "The British Counterpart", will discuss the formation and role of the
modern monarchy, and its retention of certain powers and privileges since
the formation of Parliament. The section will also address the civil and
criminal immunity the monarch always enjoys and how that immunity can,
at times, protect members of the Crown in the course of their executive
3. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (giving the President of the United States
absolute immunity for official actions within the outer perimeter of his duties of office).
4. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 698-99.
5. Jones v Clinton, Nos. 95-1050, 95-1167, 1996 WL 5658, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996).
6. Id.
7. Id. at *3,
8. Id. at *1.
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duties. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the differences between the
British monarch and the American President and allow the reader to
determine if the discussed immunity is necessary in today's day and age.
II. THE AMERICAN POSITION
It is often stated the United States is the most litigious nation in the
world. This belief is evident by the number of law suits filed and litigated
in American courts each year. By 1990, the legal profession became a
ninety-one billion dollar a year industry and employed nearly one million
people.9 The profession has helped give the average person the ability to
file suit against anyone, even against the President of the United States.
Until the final days of Richard Nixon's tenure in office, it was
believed the President of the United States enjoyed complete immunity
from suit.'0 This belief changed over time. In a series of decisions, the
President's omnipotent status has been eroded. Nevertheless, the courts
have continuously had difficulty in balancing presidential immunity with
the need of the judicial branch to administer justice. Several important
court decisions have helped shed light on how far the judicial branch may
go to exercise its jurisdiction over a president. The following cases
indicate the President is subject to some legal process, and is not above the
laws of the United States.
III. THE COURT'S SUBPOENA POWER OVER THE PRESIDENT
In United States v. Burr;" the trial court subpoenaed President
Thomas Jefferson. Aaron Burr12 wanted Jefferson to provide a letter
which Burr intended to use as evidence to help defend a charge of treason.
The government conceded Burr's right to serve the President with a
subpoena to testify, but decided that a subpoena duces tecum cannot be
served on the President because a request for documents could disclose
confidential communications which only the President is entitled to read.' 3
With Chief Justice John Marshall presiding, the trial court recognized that
9. ROBERT MACCRATE, THE PROFESSION FOR WHICH LAWYERS MUST PREPARE-A
VISION OF THE SKILLS AND VALUES NEW LAWYERS SHOULD SEEK TO ACQUIRE 5 (1992) (quoting
U.S. Industrial Outlook 1991, Professional Services: Legal Services (SIC81), at 52-54).
10. Laura K. Ray, From Prerogative to Accountability: The Amenability of the President to
Suit, 80 KY. L.J. 739 (1991).
11. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,629d).
12, Aaron Burr (1756-1836) was the third Vice President of the United States (1801-1805)
under Thomas Jefferson. Burr was accused of trying to raise an army against Spain and conspiring
to divide the Union.
13. Ray, supra note 10, at 744.
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a subpoena duces tecum might jeopardize public safety, but held the
President must hand over the letter.'4 The court added that portions of the
letter may be withheld in the interest of national security. 5 More
interesting, Marshall ruled the courts cannot proceed against the President
as an ordinary individual. 6 Marshall's decision was revisited when a
federal district court ordered President James Monroe to submit to a
subpoena and serve as a witness in a court-martial hearing. 7 The Attorney
General believed Monroe had a legal duty to cooperate with a subpoena."
Claiming he could not leave his official duties, Monroe answered a series
of interrogatories which the court sent by mail.' 9
Perhaps the most significant case recognizing the courts' power to
subpoena the President, thus legitimizing Marshall's decision was United
States v. Nixon."° President Nixon challenged a subpoena ordering him to
turn over tape recordings of his discussions which were needed for a
criminal trial.2 ' Nixon argued that the separation of powers doctrine
precluded the court from exercising its jurisdiction over the executive
branch.2 In a unanimous decision (without Justice Rehnquist's
participation), the Supreme Court held the doctrine of separation of powers
and confidentiality do not give the President an unqualified privilege of
immunity from the judicial process.' The Court noted that unless
President Nixon could show the released communications would jeopardize
military, diplomatic, or national security interests, his arguments could not
prevail over the fair administration of criminal justice.24
14. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34-35. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the following: "A subpoena
duces tecum, then, may issue to any person to whom an ordinary subpoena may issue, directing him
to bring any appear of which the party praying it has a right to avail himself as testimony." Id. at
34-35.
15. Ray, supra note 10, at 750; see Id. at 752 n.69 (explaining Burr's concession the
"constitutional officer" has a right to withhold certain documents from the public); see also Burr, 25
F. Cas. at 35.
16. Ray, supra note 10, at 753 (citing United States v. Burr II, 25 F. Cas. at 192).
17. RONALD ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES AND FOOTNOTES 281
(4th ed. 1993).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 706.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 713.
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IV. THE COURTS' INJUNCTION POWER OVER THE PRESIDENT
The Reconstruction Act of 18672' set the battleground for the
Supreme Court to hear Mississippi v. Johnson.26 Mississippi attempted to
enjoin President Andrew Johnson27 from enforcing the Reconstruction Act
of 1867.28 The Supreme Court unanimously held a state cannot sue the
President to block enforcement of a statute it believes is unconstitutional.29
Furthermore, the court stated that the separation of powers doctrine
precludes the courts from exercising its jurisdiction over the executive
branch and the Reconstruction Act was purely executive and political."
Nevertheless, the decision in Mississippi v. Johnson did not necessarily
preclude the courts from enjoining the President in his performance of
ministerial duties or hearing a suit against the President for noninjunctive
relief.3 '
It was not until the 1950s when the Supreme Court heard
arguments in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer3 2 that Mississippi v.
Johnson was revisited. President Harry Truman ordered his Commerce
Secretary to seize the nation's steel mills when management and labor
were unable to resolve a wage dispute which threatened to close down the
industry in the middle of the Korean War.3 3 In a hearing before the United
States District Court, the government argued the precedent in Mississippi
v. Johnson prohibited the court from exercising its jurisdiction over the
President or his agents. 34 The District Court ruled against the government
but distinguished the current case from Johnson on the grounds that the
25. Reconstruction, which lasted from about 1865 to 1877, was the era following the
American Civil War (1861-1864) in which the states of South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida,
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee were
reinstated into the Union.
26. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 475 (1868).
27. Andrew Johnson was the seventeenth President of the United States who succeeded to the
Presidency upon the assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 1865. A lifetime member of the
Democratic party, Johnson was selected by Lincoln, a member of the Republican party, to give the
ticket a non-partisan character. Johnson and the Republican-controlled Congress were constantly at
odds with each other, especially where reconstruction was at issue. As a result, Andrew Johnson
became the only President to be impeached. The opposition failed by one vote to gain his
conviction; thus, Johnson was able to finish out his term in office, which ended in 1869.
28. Ray, supra note 10, at 753.
29. Johnson, 71 U.S. at 475.
30. Id. at 499, 500.
31. Id. at 499.
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. Id. at 582.
34. Ray, supra note 10, at 760.
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complaint named the Commerce Secretary and not President Truman. 5
When the case reached the Supreme Court, council for the steel mills
argued that Johnson did not pertain to presidential subordinates and thus an
injunction would be permissible.36 The majority opinion did not address
whether Youngstown was actually a suit against the President; but at the
very least it established that one can challenge a presidential order if the
named defendant is a presidential agent.37 In the end, the Supreme Court
invalidated Truman's executive order stating the Constitution does not
authorize the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to seize private
property.3" Eventually, the ability to enjoin a presidential order by directly
naming the President instead of a "named agent" became acceptable in the
eyes of the Court, but it is nevertheless difficult to achieve. 9 The same
can be said for a writ of mandamus, though difficult to obtain, it is not
legally impossible.'
V. SUIT AGAINST THE PRESIDENT-NIXON V. FITZGERALD
In 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the
Department of the Air Force, testified before a congressional
subcommittee about cost overruns and technical difficulties concerning the
development of the C-5A air-transport.4 When Richard Nixon assumed
the presidency in 1969, Fitzgerald's position was eliminated.42 Fitzgerald
believed his dismissal was politically motivated and challenged his
termination before the Civil Service Commission.43 The Commission
found Fitzgerald's termination was not in retaliation for his congressional
35. Id.
36. Id. at 761.
37. Id. at 763.
38. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588; see also Ray, supra note 10, at 761-63.
39. See National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees v. Nixon, 349 F. Supp. 18 (D.C.
1972) (holding that plaintiffs' failed to show that a preliminary injunction to require the President to
adjust wages of federal employees was in the public interest); see also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 1141 (D.C. 1990) (holding that members of Congress were not entitled to a preliminary
injunction directed to the President prohibiting him from initiating military action against Iraq
because the issue was not ripe for consideration).
40. See San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(holding that no proposition has been found to suggest that a United States District Court may
compel the head of the Executive Branch of government to take any action whatsoever). But see
Hourigan v. Carter, 478 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. III. 1979) (holding that mandamus can only be used to
compel ministerial and non-discretionary duties).
41. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 4, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, (No. 79-1738), cen. denied (1980).
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
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appearance, but that it did involve "personal factors unique to him. "" The
Commission ordered him reinstated in another position equivalent to the
one he held plus back pay; Fitzgerald was not satisfied with what he
believed was an inadequate ruling. 5 Fitzgerald filed suit against several
Nixon White House staff members and eventually, in 1978, amended his
complaint to include President Nixon.' President Nixon's motion for
summary judgment (claiming presidential immunity) was denied, giving
him the opportunity to make a collateral appeal which was dismissed
summarily.47  The Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments,
and eventually ruled that the President enjoys absolute immunity for
official actions he commits while President .4 The Court developed its
rationale using precedent and history. The ruling in Fitzgerald can be
summed up as follows:
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that the petitioner, as a former President of the
United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from
damages predicated on his official acts. We consider the
immunity a functionally mandated incident of the
President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional
tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our
49history ....
The Court examined the powers and responsibilities of the President and
held that the President's powers are unique as compared to other executive
officers because the President has the responsibility to execute the nation's
laws as well as shape United States foreign policy.5" Fitzgerald argued that
the only immunity mentioned in the Constitution is reserved for
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id.
46. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 6, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, (No. 79-1738), cert. denied (1980). Fitzgerald also filed
suit against Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, two of Nixon's top aides. The Supreme Court
ruled in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 800 (1982), that cabinet members and aides are only entitled
to qualified immunity, which would be denied only if the official reasonably should have known that
his or her act was a violation of law. See Aviva Orenstein, Recent Development, Presidential
Immunity From Civil Liability, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 236, 240-42 (1983).
47. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 731.
48. Id. at 749.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 749-50; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that executive
officials are usually entitled only to qualified immunity).
5231996]
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Congressman and presidential immunity must not have been considered.5'
The Court did not agree and listed several reasons why Fitzgerald had to
be wrong. First, because presidential immunity is not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean it does not exist. 2 The Court
noted judges have immunity even though the Constitution does not
specifically grant such a privilege. 3  Second, the Court already has
extended to certain executive branch officials (i.e., prosecutors) absolute
immunity. 4 Finally, there is historical evidence that the Framers assumed
the President has immunity.55 Senator Ellsworth and Vice President John
Adams, both delegates to the Constitutional Convention, believed the
President was not subject to the Court's jurisdiction.56  Alexander
Hamilton, noted in the Federalist, that an executive who is not independent
will equate to a weak government.57 Thomas Jefferson, the nation's third
President, wrote the following to the prosecutors in Aaron Burr's trial:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the
independence of the legislature, executive and judiciary.
But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if
he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could
bandy him from pillar to post, help him constantly
trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw
him entirely from his constitutional duties?"8
To summarize its position, the Court quoted Joseph Story, a nineteenth
century commentator, who observed:
There are incidental powers belonging to the executive
department which are necessarily implied from the nature
of the functions which are confided to it. Among these
must necessarily be included the power to perform them
51. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 750; see U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 6 (guaranteeing immunity in all cases,
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, from arrest during a congressional session).
52. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 750 n.31
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 751 n.31. For more historical commentary on immunity, see Memorandum
(Attachment) in Support of President Clinton's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Presidential
Immunity at 1, Jones v. Fitzgerald (No. LR-C-94-290) (1994) [hereinafter President's Attachment].
57. President's Attachment, supra note 56, at 4-5.
58. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 751 n.31 (1982) (quoting 10 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (P.
Ford ed. 1905)).
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without any obstruction whatsoever. The President
cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or
detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his
office, and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in
civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability.59
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed suit
against President Clinton claiming that while governor of Arkansas,
Clinton violated her equal protection and due process rights by making
"noncoercive sexual advances."' Jones claims that she rebuffed Governor
Clinton's advances and as a result, her superiors treated her in a "hostile
and rude manner" and she was denied merit pay raises.61 Jones voluntarily
left her state job in 1993.62 She filed her complaint one day short of the
three year statute of limitations, which incidentally was the year and a half
point of Bill Clinton's presidential term.6
3
President Clinton moved to dismiss the complaint arguing the
precedent of Nixon v. Fitzgerald gave the President absolute immunity
from civil suit. 64 The district court ruled that since the actions allegedly
committed by the President occurred before his term of office commenced,
the President, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, is
only entitled to "limited or temporary" immunity from immediate trial but
discovery and deposition may proceed against the President. 65 In January
59. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 418-19
(lst ed. 1833); see Nixon, 457 U.S. at 776-77.
60. Memorandum in Support of President Clinton's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of
Presidential Immunity at 15, Jones v. Ferguson (No. LR-C-94-290) (1994) [hereinafter President's
Memorandum].
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 697-99. Prior to this case, there have only been three Presidents
sued for actions they allegedly committed before they assumed office. People ex rel. Hurley v.
Roosevelt, 179 N.Y. 544 (1904). In Hurley, Theodore Roosevelt, was a member of the Board of
Police for the New York City Police Department before he assumed the Presidency. A suit was filed
against Roosevelt and the other members when a patrolman believed that he was unjustly dismissed.
The suit was resolved in the Board's favor. The New York Court of Appeals, without opinion,
affirmed the lower court's decision. In Devault v. Truman, 194 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946), President
Harry Truman was sued because of a decision he made as a state court judge in 1931. The dispute
was resolved in Truman's favor with no mention of presidential immunity. In Bailey v. Kennedy,
No. 757,200 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1962), President John Kennedy was sued when delegates to the prior
Democratic Party Convention used a car they claimed was given to them by high ranking members
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of 1996, this decision was reversed in part by an appeals court, which
ruled that Fitzgerald does not protect actions outside the outer perimeter of
the President's office and thus Bill Clinton, individually, is subject to trial
for actions he allegedly committed before he became president. 6 As such,
the absolute immunity Fitzgerald provided the President has at least, for
the time being, been strictly applied to provide immunity only for official
actions committed while in office.
Before discussing Fitzgerald, the District Court spent a significant
amount of time discussing the "English Legacy." The Court believed that
the question concerning immunity lies within English law.67 The Court
noted English law, which is the cornerstone of American law, eventually
stood for the proposition the king is under no man, but under God and the
law.68 At the same time, the Court noted the Petition of Rights,69 signed
by King Charles I, made it apparent the king's prerogative was limited and
he would be subject to the law.7' Examining the steady decline of the
king's divine right, the Court concluded that through the reception statutes
which allowed, as of a certain date, English common law and acts of
parliament to be received in new independent states, the rights of the
President would by implication not exceed the rights of the weakened
monarch in the early seventeenth century."
of the Democratic Convention. The plaintiffs argued they were injured when the defendant's
"agents" negligently operated the car. President Kennedy made a motion to stay the proceedings on
the basis of the Soldier and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, which gives serviceman the right to stay
proceedings while on active duty. He argued that as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he
also enjoyed such a privilege. The trial court denied his motion and the case was settled out of court.
See Statement of Interest of the United States, Brief of Solicitor General at 1, Jones v. Clinton, 869
F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark 1994) (No. LR-C-94-290) (Solicitor Gen. Brief 1994).
66. Jones v. Clinton, Nos. 95-1050, 95-1167 1996 WL 5658 at *6 (8th Cir. Ark.). President
Clinton's lawyers plan to appeal to the full appeals court whose decision will possibly be reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court. See Mimi Hall, Court: Paula Jones' Suit Can Go to Trial,
USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 1996, at 4A.
67. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 692.
68. Id. at 693.
69. The Petition of Rights was a further restraint on arbitrary government. The Petition
condemned taxation without Parliament's consent, imprisonment without showing cause, quartering
of soldiers, and the misuse of martial law. By 1689, the Bill of Rights was passed by Parliament.
See A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA-TEXT AND COMMENTARY 26-27 (1964).
70. Id.
71. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 693. The court stated the following:
The events of this period in English legal and political history were conclusive in
determining the end of 'the divine rights of Kings' and subjecting the King to the law.
This is historically important to us in that the founding fathers cast very little light
(outside the impeachment provision) upon suits against the President, and this matter
was never addressed by Congress in passing laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution.
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The "English Legacy" helped the Court determine the extent of
Presidential immunity. The lofty Seventeenth Century English statement
that "the King ought to be under no man, but under God and the law"'
appears to coincide with the modern American proposition the President is
not above the law. 7' Though both statements are egalitarian, to some they
may appear to be ludicrous and simply naive. Was the Monarch ever held
to the law? As a result of the "down-sizing" of the Monarch's divine right
during the Seventeenth Century, the Court reached the conclusion that if
the monarch is not above the law, neither is the President. 74 Though it is
true that the monarch's divine right has been effectively abrogated, it can
not be accurately stated the British Monarch is entirely under the law.
VII. THE BRITISH COUNTERPART 7"
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a
nation immersed in stately tradition preceding the Constitution of the
United States by hundreds of years. The formation of Great Britain's legal
system can be traced to the passage of the Magna Carta.76 The Magna
"It must be assumed that the rights of the President do not rise above the rights of an
English monarch in the early 17th Century."(emphasis added).
Id. at 693-94 n.1. But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982). The court stated the
following:
Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law,
any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional
heritage and structure. .. . This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be
considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a system structured to
achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
Id. The Supreme Court apparently wanted to de-emphasize the importance of English political
tradition, a tradition which the Founding Fathers no doubt wanted to abandon. The Founding
Fathers instead created a system of government that mandates that the three branches be separate
in identity, but equal in power. The United Kingdom does not adhere to such a concept. This is
evident, as explained later, by the fact the executive powers of the United Kingdom are exercised
by the governing party in Parliament.
72. Statement was originally coined by Henry Bracton, a 13,h Century legal scholar. Sir
Edward Coke, who served as Queen Elizabeth's attorney and was later Chief Justice of the King's
Bench, stated to King James I that "Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub deo
et lege" [That the King ought not to be under any man, but under God and the law]. See Jones, 869
F. Supp. at 693 n. 1 (quoting DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 203 (1963)).
73. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 758 n.41
74. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 696.
75. Many Commonwealth nations have laws regarding immunity and for a discussion on these
similarities and differences, see COLIN McNARIN, GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 3 (1977).
76. BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF
ENGLAND 5 (1899).
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Carta is one of the most significant documents ever introduced to the
people of England,77 who had no rights except for what the king saw fit to
give.78 The Magna Carta, which was approved by King John in 1215, 79
guaranteed certain rights to the barons and eventually to all the people of
England. 0 On that fateful day, the principle was established that the king
cannot override the law; 8 thus the king's tyrannical right to rule by
arbitrary decisions ended.
By 1688, the English Parliament, which did not exist when the
Magna Carta was signed in 1215, became the supreme law making body of
England.82 Though Parliament's ascendance overshadowed the powers of
the monarch, there was an aspect of the monarch's divine right that has
always remained, despite what others may believe. This "holdover" has
given the Queen,83 and the Crown as a whole, unique privileges, which the
United States President will never have.
VIII. THE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE CROWN
The American system of government is based upon the concept of
separation of powers. The United States Constitution mandates that the
77. Representing eighty percent of the population of the United Kingdom, England is simply
one country out of four that comprises the United Kingdom. Wales came under the rule of the
English Crown in the thirteenth century and formally entered the union by 1536. Scotland, which
shared the same king of England since 1603, formally joined the United Kingdom of Great Britain in
1707. Ruled by the English Crown since the twelfth century, Ireland formally joined the union in
1800. In 1922, the Irish Free State separated from the United Kingdom. The six counties of the
North (Northern Ireland) remained a part of the United Kingdom. See COLIN C. TURPIN, BRITISH
GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 218-39 (2d ed. 1990).
78. BARRINGTON, supra note 76, at 5
79. King John (1167-1216) ruled England upon the death of his brother Richard in 1199.
John, who was involved in a war with France, levied heavy taxes in order to support his military
efforts. In 1214 John returned to England after being defeated by France. With widespread
discontent by his barons (who renounced their allegiance to John), as well as by the Church of
England, John agreed to accept the demands of his barons and had his seal affixed to the Magna
Carta on June 19, 1215. See HOWARD, supra note 69, at 8-9.
80. HOWARD, supra note 69, at 8-10. The Magna Carta granted such important rights as tax
relief from the king (chapter 12), the location of courts in certain jurisdictions (chapter 17),
reasonable fines and punishments (chapter 20), compensation for taking private property (chapter
28), a free person will not be punished except by lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the
land (chapter 39), availability of justice (chapter 40), and freedom to leave and re-enter the kingdom
(chapter 42).
81. NORMAN WILDING & PHILIP LAUNDY, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PARLIAMENT 379 (1961).
82. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 24. The Bill of Rights required the consent of Parliament
before taxes were levied. See HOWARD, supra note 69, at 26.
83. The current Queen, Elizabeth II, has been Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland since the death of her father, King George VI, in 1952. The Queen, as well as
past queens and kings, is also known as the Monarch or Sovereign.
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executive, legislature, and the judiciary have mutually exclusive members,
and at times, mutually exclusive responsibilities which prohibit one branch
from encroaching upon the powers of another. In the United Kingdom,
this concept is not as definite. The legislative body of Parliament makes
the laws, the Crown, headed symbolically by the monarch and steered by
specific members of Parliament, has the authority and power to enforce the
laws. Specifically, the Crown consists of the Monarch, ministers, who are
usually sitting members of Parliament, the Central Governmental
Departments (civil service), and the armed forces.' The Monarch is the
incarnation of the Crown and could not be separated from that body. The
Crown's powers include the prerogative powers of the Monarch, the
executive powers exercised by her ministers, the civil service, and the
armed forces.
The United Kingdom without a king or queen would be like the
United States without a president; the nation would not function within its
constitutional system of government. Though the current Queen is
perceived as a symbolic figure of days long gone, her role in certain
matters is constitutionally mandated. The Queen is given the prerogative
power 6 to dismiss her ministers, 7 or the Prime Minister, if either were to
lose the support of the government.88 Similarly, the Queen is also given
the opportunity to appoint the Prime Minister, but such selection is
governed by convention which mandates that she appoint the person who
can command the confidence of the majority party in the House of
Commons, usually the party leader.89 The Queen is the only person who
84. See DAVID C. M. YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38
(5TH ed. 1978). In several Commonwealth nations, the term Crown is also used in the same
manner. For purposes of this article, unless otherwise noted, the term Crown will be used to refer
only to the executive branch in the United Kingdom.
85. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 150-5 1.
86. Common law powers, not already delegated by Parliament, may only be exercised by the
Sovereign. Such powers would include, among other things, the power to make treaties, recognize
foreign governments, grant a royal pardon, etc. See Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971] I WLR
1037 (CA).
87. A minister is a member of the Prime Minister's cabinet. The Prime Minister and cabinet
ministers are collectively referred to as the "Crown's Ministers."
88. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 150-51. Though the Queen is given such powers, in political
reality and necessity, the Prime Minster would offer his resignation or call for a dissolution of
Parliament.
89. Id. at 146. The queen cannot appoint anyone she wants to the office of Prime Minster,
but in 1957 and 1963 she was given the rare opportunity to solely appoint a prime minister when the
majority party did not have an apparent leader. Today this opportunity would be diminished by
internal party rules which guide the Queen in her selection. Since 1957, Labor party rules prohibit a
member of the Labor Party to sit as prime minister without first being elected party leader. See
PETER BROMHEAD, BRITAIN'S DEVELOPING CONSTITUTION 27-29 (1974).
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may dissolve Parliament, but such action may only be taken if the Prime
Minister requests a dissolution.90 Nevertheless, it has been asserted by
British Constitutional experts9O ' that the Queen may have the right to refuse
a Prime Minister's request for dissolution.' Though Governor-Generals93
in several commonwealth nations have refused Prime Ministerial requests
for dissolution, the Sovereign in the United Kingdom has not refused one
since the passage of the Reform Act of 1832.' 4 The Queen has the power
to dismiss her ministers, and it appears that convention would allow her to
do so if she felt that it were necessary but in practice the Prime Minister is
the one who actually dismisses a minister.95
The Queen does not have the power to alter the law, but she does
retain a prerogative power by Order of Council" to legislate and regulate
matters not already governed by statute.' The Crown may extend its
sovereignty and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea which it has not
90. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 155. The Prime Minister would seek a dissolution of
Parliament if he or she no longer commanded the confidence of their party.
91. GEOFFREY MARSHALL ET AL., SOME PROBLEMS OF THE CONSTITUTION 40-41 (5TH ED.
1971) quoted in TIJRPIN, supra note 77, at 156.
92. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 155-56.
93. In commonwealth nations that recognize the Queen as their Sovereign, the Governor-
General is the person, usually appointed by the Prime Minister, who wields the power of the Crown
in the Queen's absence. See WILDING, supra note 81, at 272-73.
94. TuRPIN, supra note 77, at 155-56 (relying on Sir Peter Rawlinson, Dissolution in the
United Kingdom, 58 THE PARLIAMENTARIAN 1, 2 (1977)).
95. TuRPIN, supra note 77, at 150-51. Since the passage of the Reform Act of 1832, no
Sovereign has ever dismissed a Prime Minister in the United Kingdom. In 1975, the Governor-
General of Australia, Sir John Kerr, acting in the name of the Queen, dismissed the Prime Minister
and all ministers in the Labor government when they no longer could govern effectively. The
Governor-General wrote the Prime Minister the following:
In accordance with section 64 of the Constitution I hereby determine you appointment
as my Chief Advisor and Head of government. It follows that I also hereby determine
the appointments of all the Ministers in your Government. You have previously told
me that you would never resign an election.. .or a double dissolution and that the only
way in which such an election could be obtained would be by my dismissal of you and
your ministerial colleagues. You have persisted in your attitude and I have accordingly
acted as indicated. I propose to send for the Leader of the Opposition and to
commission him to form a new caretaker government until an election can be held.
Id. at 152.
96. Orders of Council are made by the Privy Council. Privy Council membership is partly
governed by convention. Conventional council members include past and present Ministers, the
Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Speaker of the House of Commons, and any other
distinguished person who the Queen may appoint. Membership is for life. The Council, which has
several hundred members, meets in full upon the death or coronation of the Monarch. Smaller
committees meet when they need to exercise the Monarch's Royal Prerogative. Membership in the
council is for life. YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 43-44.
97. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 382-83.
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previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or jurisdictions.9 During the
Falkland Island conflict in 1982, the government used the prerogative of
the Crown to requisition ships in "any of the Channel Islands, any colony,
any country outside Her Majesty's dominions in which Her Majesty has
jurisdiction in right of the Government of the United Kingdom."99 But
perhaps the most important power the Queen retains is the right to refuse
to assent to legislation passed by Parliament, However, this veto power
has not been exercised by a monarch in over two hundred years."
The monarch, though no longer omnipotent, has enough power if
used unwisely to halt the workings of the government and cause a
constitutional crisis. The executive powers formally exercised by the
sovereign alone are now in the hands of the ministers of the Crown,
namely the Prime Minister.' 0
The Prime Minister is usually a member of the House of
Commons. 2 As such, his discretion and powers are for the most part
unlimited. The British Constitution gives the Prime Minister the power to
request a dissolution of Parliament and call a general election." 3 The
Prime Minister, who is an elected member of Parliament, chairs the
cabinet meetings, appoints ministers,'O° and has the authority to intervene
in virtually all matters of government and foreign relations.0 5 Whereas
the President of the United States has the unfettered discretion to dominate
the executive branch and matters of foreign policy, the Prime Minister, by
Great Britain's formal lack of separation of powers, occupies a dual role
which allows the office holder to dominate the executive as well as
legislative functions of government. Though some may want to call the
Prime Minister a "first among equals," in fact the Prime Minister could
easily be considered a "constitutionally elected dictator."
As shown, the Queen has a considerable amount of constitutional
power. Yet, unlike the President of the United States, the Queen can do
98. Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd., [1968] 2 QB 740, 753.
99. TURPiN, supra note 77, at 383-84.
100. Id. at 96. See also RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 189-90 (1994).
101. Id. at 158.
102. Id. at 176.
103. RICHARD ROSE, PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS 8 (Richard Rose & Ezra A.
Suleiman, eds., 1980). Section 7 of the Parliament Act, 1911, mandates that Parliament will
automatically dissolve in exactly five years from the last general election if the monarch has not
dissolved Parliament sooner. See YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 14.
104. ROSE, supra note 103, at 22.
105. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 176.
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no wrong.' 06 This ancient maxim, which stems from the days when the
monarch ruled by divine right, persists today,1 7 but now although the
Queen can do no wrong, her ministers personally, as well as the
government can.' 08
The Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 "°9 played a significant role in
allowing suits to be brought against the Crown."0 Prior to the Act, no
proceedings for criminal or civil actions could be brought against the
Crown."' Thus, a servant of the Crown who committed an illegal action
pursuant to duty, would bear the sole responsibility for that action because
"the Crown can neither commit nor authorize nor be responsible for any
wrongdoing .... ""2 The 1947 Act allowed civil proceedings by and
against the Crown or governmental agencies," 3 whereas prior to the act,
one used a petition of right" 4 to seek relief against the Crown. Presently,
one may directly sue the Crown via an appropriate governmental
department or agency by permitting actions to be brought against the
Crown for torts committed by its servants or agents for any breach of its
106. See M. v. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. 537, 551; SIR DAVID LINDSAY KIER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 528-29 (9th ed. 1969); see also
R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 305, 307 (1959); W.S.
Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 LAW Q. REV. 280, 293 (1922).
107. See Home Office, [1993] 3 ALL E.R. at 540.
108. H.W.R. Wade, Injunctive Relief Against the Crown and Ministers, 104 LAW Q. REV. 4,
5 (Jan. 1991).
109. For purposes of the immediate discussion, the pertinent parts of this act are as follows:
Section one allows a subject to sue the Crown directly except for actions which the Crown remains
privileged from legal action for damages, for the recovery of a liquidated sum, for specific
performance, and for contracts dependent on money from Parliament. As such, no soldier may sue
the Crown because the control of the armed forces are still under the prerogative power of the
Crown. Section two permits actions to be brought against the Crown for torts committed by servants
or agents for any breach of its duties. Section two did not remove the right to sue the actual
tortfeasor. Section seventeen provides for the minister of the Civil Service to publish a list of
authorized government departments so that civil proceedings against the Crown may be brought
against the appropriate department or if no department exists, the Attorney General. Section forty of
the act preserves the monarch's personal immunity from civil actions. See Home Office, [1993] 3
All E.R. 537, 554; YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 129-30.
110. KIER, supra note 106, at 528.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 528-29.
113. Id. at529.
114. A petition of right is a method by which an aggrieved subject would petition the Crown
for relief. This method was at one time the only way to obtain relief and a judgment against the
Crown, which the Crown did not have to satisfy. The Crown Proceedings Act did away with this
method. It should be noted that the Crown has traditionally been cooperative in taking responsibility
for the actions of its servants and that the petition of right proceeding usually proceeded as ordinary
actions between subjects. See Id.; see also Holdsworth, supra note 107, at 290.
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duties that give rise to tortious liability." 5 At the same time, this Act does
not prevent a minister from being held personally liable for his own
tortious actions.' However, unlike the President of the United States, the
Queen, or the reigning monarch, can never be held personally responsible
in a civil court for torts committed by her." 7
IX. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CROWN
As in the United States, the powers of government are subject to
judicial control."' In the United Kingdom, executives are generally
immune from the control of the courts so long as their actions are within
the parameters of the law. "' As such, decisions by a minister or other
public authority are not subject to appeal, but a person may challenge the
exercise of a minister's powers by means of judicial review.' The courts
have the power to order a public authority to perform a duty, by a writ of
mandamus, or to refrain from unlawful action, by a writ of prohibition.
The courts also have the power to create an order which annuls a decision
made contrary to law, by a writ of certiorari, to make a declaration of a
party's legal rights, or impose an injunction,' which until recently was
not available against the Crown or ministers acting on behalf of the
Crown. "
The right to enjoin a minister of the Crown and hold that minister
or his department in contempt for violating an injunction was decided in
the benchmark case of M. v. Home Office. " M was a citizen of Zaire
who arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed political asylum.'2 After
several months of review, his claim was rejected by the Secretary of State
who made plans to deport M back to Zaire.'" M's solicitors made
application for leave to apply for judicial review. 26 On the evening M was
115. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 554; see also PETER W. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE
CROWN, ifra note 161, at 7.
116. Home Office, [19931 3 All E.R. at 554 (citing § 2 of The Crown Proceedings Act of
1947).
117. YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 130; GRAY, supra note 105, at 307.
118. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 414.
119. LORD MACDERMOrr, PROTECTION FROM POWER UNDER ENGLISH LAW 81 (1986).
120. TURPIN, supra note 77 at 414.
121. Id. see also Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 558-60.
122. Home Office, [1993] 3 ALL ER at 558-560.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 542-43.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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to be deported, the judge indicated he believed that there was an arguable
point arising out of the application and that he wanted M to remain in the
United Kingdom so M's application could be made to a nominated
judge. 27 The judge adjourned the Court session believing that pending a
further hearing, M would not be removed from the United Kingdom.
2 1
Due to miscommunication between M's solicitors, the Home Office, and
the judge, M was deported against the wishes of the Court. 129
Proceedings were commenced on behalf of M against the Secretary
of State for contempt in failing to comply with the judge's order. 3 ' The
counsel for the Home Office argued an injunction could not be used
against ministers of the Crown in judicial review proceedings, and thus the
order of contempt which the Court of Appeals upheld against the Home
Secretary was in error.'31 The House of Lords unanimously found the
Home Office, and not the Home Secretary personally, in contempt because
the office inadvertently violated the judge's order not to deport M.'3 2 The
House of Lords, speaking through Lord Woolf, held language in Section
31(a) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981 gives the courts the right to make
coercive orders, such as injunctions, against ministers of the Crown in
judicial review proceedings. 13' Furthermore, under Rules of the Supreme
127. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. 537.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 546-47.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 541-42.
132. All E.R. Annual Review 1993, Contempt of Court 106.
133. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 538, 555-560; see also Supreme Court Act 1981, §
31, reprinted in 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 991 (4th ed. 1991). Relevant parts of § 31 read as
follows:
Application for judicial review-i) An application to the High Court for one or more of the
following forms of relief, namely-a) an order of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari; b) a
declaration or injunction under subsection 2; or c) an injunction under section 30
retraining a person not entitled to so from acting in an office to which that section applies,
shall be made in accordance with rules of court by a procedure to known as an application
for judicial review. 2) A declaration may be made or an injunction granted under this
subjection in any case where an application for judicial review, seeing that relief, has been
made and the High Court considers that, having regard to a) the nature of the matters in
respect of which relief may be granted by orders of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari;
b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by such
orders; and c) all the circumstances of the case, it would be just and convenient for the
declaration to be made or the injunction to be granted, as the case may be....
Id. But see Section 21(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, reprinted in 13 HALBURY'S
STATUES 20 (4th ed. 1991) which states the following:
The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order
against an officer of the Crown if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order
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Court Order 53, r 3(10), which was given statutory authority by Section
31 of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, the court can grant interim
injunctions against ministers as well as make a finding of contempt against
the minister or his government. 34
This decision directly conflicted with an earlier House of Lords
decision rendered by Lord Bridge in Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State
for Transport,'35 which refused to accept the notion that Section 3 1 allows
injunctions in judicial review proceedings to be made against the Crown or
a minister of the Crown acting in their official capacity. 136
Lord Bridge's decision was based partly on the notion that Section
31 of the Supreme Court Act did not expressly extend the right for a judge
to order an injunction against a minister of the Crown in judicial review
proceedings. 37  At the same time, his reasoning in Factortame relied
would be to give any relief against the Crown which could not have been obtained in
proceedings against the Crown.
Id.
134. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563. R.S.C Ord. 53, r 3(10) states the following:
Where leave to apply for judicial review is granted, then (a) if the relief sought is an
order of a prohibition or certiorari and the court so directs, the grant shall operate as a
stay of the proceedings to which the application related until the determination of the
application or until the court otherwise orders; (b) if any other relief is sought, the
court may at any time grant in the proceedings such interim relief as could be granted
in an action begun by writ.
Id.
135. Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport, [19891 2 All E.R. 692, 703-08. The
European Economic Community attempted to conserve fish stock by means of national quotas. Not
a member of the EEC at the time, Spain fared poorly under the quota system. Several Spanish
fishing companies attempted to secure part of the British quota by buying pre-existing British fishing
vessels or re-registering their vessels under the British flag. To prevent, this "quota-hopping," the
Secretary of State for Transport promulgated regulations under which a fishing vessel could only
qualify for entry on the new British register if its legal title was at least 75% British owned. The
applicants, who believed that the nationality requirements were unjust and against Community Law,
applied for judicial review. The Divisional Court decided to obtain a preliminary ruling from the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), but such a ruling would take several years. The Divisional Court
granted interim relief ordering the regulations to be "disapplied." The House of Lords in
Factortame, held that the court did not have the power under English Law to make an interim order
displacing an act of Parliament. Nevertheless, the House of Lords referred the matter back to the
E.C.J.. Meanwhile, due to another proceeding challenging the regulations (see Case 246/89
Commission v. United Kingdom), the E.C.J. made an interim order that the Secretary's regulations
concerning the nationality requirements must be suspended. Subsequently, the E.C.J. ruled in
Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of Statefor Transport (No 2) Case c-213/89 [1991] 1 All E.R. 70 that a
national court was obliged to set aside a national law if such a law was sole obstacle preventing it
from granting relief under Community Law. See All E.R. Annual Review 1990, European
Comnunity Law 104-05; TURPIN, supra note 77, at 346-47.
136. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 561.
137. Id.
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heavily upon a lower court decision in Merricks v. Heathcoast-Amroy, 3 '
which seemed to suggest, contrary to the opinion of Lord Woolf, that a
minister can not be under a personal liability and subject to injunctive
relief for wrongs committed by a minister in his official capacity.' 3 9 Lord
Bridge's decision was further influenced by the Law Commission's 1976
report which recommended that Section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947 needed to be amended so courts may grant such injunctions against
the Crown.'40
Lord Woolf respectfully doubted Lord Bridge's reasoning in
Factortame and held the language of Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act
of 1981 allowed courts to render injunctions against the Crown in judicial
review proceedings and that RSC Ord 53, r 3(10) allowed the courts to
grant interim injunctions against the Crown. In an important caveat, Lord
Woolf stated an injunction still could not, pursuant to Section 21(2) of the
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, be handed down to the Crown or a
minister of the Crown in civil suits. 141
Lord Woolf believed that just because judicial review was not
introduced through primary legislation, it does not necessarily limit the
scope of Section 31 of the 1981 Act. 42 Perhaps to avoid delay, England
and Wales decided that an amendment to the Rules of the Supreme Court
should precede primary statutory legislation. Thus, the Law Commission's
recommendation to amend Section 21 of the 1947 Act was effectively
abandoned. 43 At the same time, the need to amend Section 21 was not
necessary because it dealt with civil proceedings, not judicial review
proceedings.'" According to Lord Woolf, "order 53 undoubtedly
138. Memicks v. Heathcoast-Amroy, [1955] 2 All E.R. 453.
139. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R., at 557 (relying on Merricks v. Heathcoat-Amory,
[1955] 2 All E.R. 453). The plaintiff in Heathcoat sought an injunction against the Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food both in his personal and official capacity. The minister argued that
the court had no jurisdiction over him in his official capacity because the court was not allowed to
grant an injunction against a minister. The minister also argued that if he acted personally, the court
did not have jurisdiction over him because he was a member of Parliament and had parliamentary
privilege. The court agreed with his argument. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 557.
140. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R., at 561. The Law Commission's 1976 report preceded
RSC (Rules of the Supreme Court) Ord. 53, which was the precursor to the Section 31 of the
Supreme Court Act of 1981. The report suggested that the lack of jurisdiction by the courts should
be addressed by amending Section 21 of the 1947 Act. The report was never implemented and
instead the Rules of the Supreme Court were amended. Id.
141. Id. at 564. Lord Woolf noted that a declaration is still the appropriate remedy on an
application for judicial review involving officers of the Crown. Id.
142. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R,. at 562.
143. Id.
144. ld. at563.
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extended the circumstances in which a declaration could be granted against
the appropriate representative of the Crown." 45 This was confirmed by
the passage of the Supreme Court Act of 1981.' Lord Woolf noted that
as a matter of construction, it would be difficult to treat Section 31 and
order 53 as not applying to ministers.' 47 To support that proposition, Lord
Woolf turned to the Northern Ireland Act of 1978, which was not
discussed in Factortame, which recognizes the limits of the 1947 Act, but
gives the court the ability to bind the Crown in non-civil proceedings (i.e.,
judicial review). 48  That Act gives the court a wide discretion to grant
interim relief, which would seem to confirm that injunctions in judicial
review proceedings may be granted against, ministers in Northern
Ireland. 149  By implication, such remedies would likely be available in
England and Wales.' ° Lord Woolf further reasoned the Rules of the
Supreme Court, order 53, r 3(10) have always been treated as giving the
Court jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions' which is linked to the
power of the court to grant final injunctions. 52 In sum, Lord Woolf wrote
the following:
I am, therefore, of the opinion, that the language of s 31
being unqualified in its terms, there is no warrant
restricting its application so that in respect of ministers and
other officers of the Crown alone the remedy of an
injunction, including an interim injunction, is not
available. In my view, the history of prerogative
proceedings against officers of the Crown supports such a
conclusion. .. .
Perhaps another reason the House of Lords ruled against the Home
Office was the fact that since the judgment of Factortame was rendered,
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Lord Woolf noted that Scotland's position would be different. See TURPIN, supra
note 77, at 415.
151. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563 (relying on R. v. Kesington and Chelsea Royal
London BC, ex p Hammell, [1989] 1 All ER 1202, [1989] QB 518).
152. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563-64 (relying on Supreme Court Act of 1981,
Section 37(1)): "The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction.
. in all cases which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so." Id.; see also Chelsea
Royal London BC, ex p Hammell, [1989] 1 All E.R. 1202, [1989] QB 518.
153. ld. at 564.
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the European Court of Justice ruled in Factortame 2154 that a national court
must set aside national legislative provisions if it was the sole obstacle in
granting interim relief in a case concerning community law.' It would
appear ironic to have one remedy available for domestic law and another
available for Community law. This is apparent by the statement made by
Lord Woolf in M v. Home Office: "It would be most regrettable if an
approach which is inconsistent with that which exists in community law
should be allowed to persist if this is not strictly necessary. "156
Though the constitutional aspects of Lord Woolf's decision are
tremendous, the practical effects are minimal because the Crown has
always been cooperative with court rulings. In the beginning of his
opinion, Lord Woolf stated, "[t]his was the first time that a minister of the
Crown had been found to be in contempt by a court.... ,, At the same
time, the above decision does not seem to directly affect the Queen since
most of her executive duties are in the hands of her ministers.
X. OTHER IMPORTANT PRIVILEGES
In the United Kingdom, laws passed by Parliament do not
personally apply to the Queen, or even the Crown as a whole, unless
otherwise specifically mentioned by express words or by necessary
implication. This means a statute would only bind the Crown if the intent
of the statute would be frustrated without the Crown being bound to its
provisions.'58 In Madras Electric. Supply Co. v. Boarland,5 9 the Privy
Council considered the liability of the appellant to pay income tax and
found it necessary to explain and uphold the Queen's, and the Crown's,
right not to pay income tax. 6° The qualified immunity from statute allows
154. Factortame Ltd. ,2, Case C-213/89 [1991] 1 All E.R. 70; see also Factortame Ltd., 2 All
E.R. 692.
155. Id. at 102. See also TIRPIN, supra note 77, at 346-47.
156. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 564.
157. Id. at 541.
158. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 141 (relying on Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corp. of
Bombay, [1947] AC 58 (PC)).
159. Madras Elec. Supply Co. v. Boarland, [1955] AC 667 (PC).
160. The decision of this case is now moot. In 1992; the Queen voluntarily agreed to pay
income tax on her private holdings. See Prince Charles Wants to Reduce Royalty, USA TODAY,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 2D. Prince Charles, the Queen's son and heir to the throne, has also agreed to pay
tax (forty percent) on his main source of revenue, the Duchy of Cornwall. Charles was previously
paying only twenty-five percent tax on the Duchy. See Edward Verity & Richard Kay, Charles
Slices Back His Tax, DAILY MAIL, May 16, 1994, at 15. The above. changes have fueled a
movement in Canada for the Governor-General to pay income tax on his $97,375 salary. Since
1953, Governor-Generals in Canada have only paid tax on their private holdings. See Joan Bryden,
Reform Demands Tax Hike for Governor General, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 8, 1995, at A3.
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the Queen, and the Crown, to escape the operation of certain laws, even
criminal laws. 161
The criminal prosecution of a defendant is handled by various
offices, notably the Crown Prosecution Service, and is tried in the Crown
Court. 62 At the same time, the maxim, "the Queen can do no wrong"
creates a legal fiction which would seemingly prevent any member of the
Crown from being tried in Crown courts. However, several courts in
other Commonwealth jurisdictions have determined it is legally possible
for the Crown to be prosecuted. 63 As discussed above, the Crown may be
held to the requirement of a statute if the statute specially applies to the
Crown.'" In a benchmark ruling handed down by the Australia High
Court, the Court ruled there is a strong presumption that the Crown is not
bound by the criminal laws.' 65 The same conclusion was reached in the
Canadian case Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Attorney General.'66
However, both cases suggest that a criminal statute may apply to the
Crown if the statute specially pertains to the Crown.'67 Nevertheless, it
appears the only sanctions that may be handed down are monetary because
the Crown cannot be imprisoned. 61 It should be noted that ministers of
the Crown are personally subject to all laws. 169  However, whereas
161. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 144; see PETER W. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN 232-
234 (1989).
162. See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, JUSTICE AND THE LAW 21-22 (MAY 1993).
163. HOGG, supra note 161, at 234.
164. See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 162, at 55, see also TURPIN,
supra note 87, at 146. Certain public health authorities that once enjoyed Crown immunity may be
subject to criminal action for breach of public health legislation. See HOGG, supra note 161, at 234.
Though the Crown may be bound by statute through necessary implication, it is very rare due to the
narrow definition of "necessary implication" in Bombay (see note 150 above) and the fact that most
penal sanctions cannot be handed down to the Crown. See HOGG, supra note 161, at 234.
165. See MCNAIRN, supra note 77, at 87-89 (relying on Cain v. Doyle, 72 C.L.R. 409
(1946)); See also FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 162, at 55.
166. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Attorney General, [1959] S.C.R. 188.
167. HOGG, supra note 161, at 234. In some cases it may be inferred that a statute binds the
Crown through necessary implication. Very few statutes, however, bind the Crown in this manner
because of the narrow definition of necessary implication in Bombay, as well as the presence of penal
sanctions in a statute that make it nearly certain that the Crown is not to be bound. Id.
168. Id. at 235.
169. Home Office, [1993] 3 All ER at 540
[Jiudges cannot enforce the law against the Crown as monarch because the Crown as
monarch can do no wrong, but judges enforce the law against the Crown as executive
and against the individuals who from time to time represent the Crown . . . . If the
minister has personally broken the law, the litigant can sue the minister . . . . in his
personal capacity.
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ministers can personally be separated from the Crown and stand trial for
their unlawful acts which exceeds the scope of their office, the Queen can
not separate herself from the Crown because she is the personification of
the Crown. Thus, it appears, using the above rationale the Queen may be
subject to monetary criminal sanctions but she can never be imprisoned." 0
In the United States, statutes using the word "persons" are
construed to exclude the government.' Nevertheless, there is no
definitive and fast rule on the subject, and the conventional interpretation
of the word "person" may be disregarded if the scope and intent of the
statute is meant to attach to the government. 7 2  As such, the above rule
appears to be no different than the rule of law in the United Kingdom, but
there is one important difference in its application. No person in an
individual capacity is free from the requirements of the law. If the
President of the United States committed a crime, he would have to be
impeached before the government could conduct a criminal proceeding.'73
The structure of the British system would make the separation of monarch
from Crown constitutionally impossible to separate. Thus, the reigning
could theoretically break a law without incurring any serious legal
consequence. '4
XI. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the Queen, 5 unlike the President of the
United States, is personally immune from liability for all torts she
commits. Furthermore, section 40(2)(f) of the Crown Proceedings Act of
1947 establishes "Crown Immunity," which appears to establish a
170. See HoGG, supra note 161, at 233 ("But where a fine is an alternative penalty, or the
only penalty, then the provision could apply to the Crown, just as it could apply to a corporation
(which also can not be imprisoned")).
171. Will v. Michigan Dept. State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
172. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
173. See President's Attachment, supra note 57, at Section 10 (arguing that Vice President
Spiro Agnew did not have to be impeached before being indicted, former Solicitor General and
Appeals Court Judge Robert Bork cited the records of the Constitutional Convention which led to the
formation of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution which maintains that
only the President must be impeached before the courts hand down an indictment). President Clinton
perhaps used Bork's theory to show that if the President must be impeached before he is indicted,
then there is no possibility that the President has to stand trial in a mere civil suit.
174. The Crown, if it broke the law, would be subject to the pressure of adverse public
opinion, which could be more damaging than penal sanctions.
175. The rights the Queen enjoys are exclusive to her alone. Nevertheless, it could be
argued that governor-generals and lieutenant-governors, who fulfill the functions of the Sovereign
in Commonwealth nations, are beyond the reach of the courts for the duration of their term. See
Gray, supra note 106, at 308.
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rebuttable presumption that the Queen (and members of the Crown) have
personal immunity from the requirements of statute unless that statute
specifically states otherwise, or if the intent of the statute would be
frustrated if the Crown did not have to abide by it. 176 At the same time, it
appears that the Queen, and the Crown, enjoy immunity from most
criminal proceedings, but unlike the Prime Minister and other members of
the Crown, the Queen can never be imprisoned. The American President
does not enjoy these three privileges.
Though the Queen's divine right to rule has been irreversibly
weakened, it appears that she personally obeys the law, and perhaps
exceeds the requirements of the law as a matter of grace, and not through
the legal coercion the President is subjected too. Furthermore, unlike the
President, who cannot serve more than two four-year terms, the British
monarch rules for life. It is hard to reconcile the British position that the
"king is under no man, but under God and the law" when the monarch
enjoys such unique personal privileges. The same cannot be said about the
President, who must, at times, submit to the jurisdiction of the courts for
wrongful actions he commits outside the scope of his office. The
difference in the immunity given to the President and the Queen is
remarkable since the President holds the world's most powerful office.
Thus, it can easily be reconciled why the President deserves the immunity
that he is given, whereas the immunity afforded to the Queen appears only
the result of tradition which conflicts with the tenets of a modem
democratic society.
176. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 142. The Act states that it will not "affect any rules of
evidence or any presumption relating to the extent to which the Crown is bound by any Act of
Parliament." Id.
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